Timberridge seeks high court review
By Parker T. Williamson, The Layman, March 13, 2012
Timberridge Evangelical Presbyterian Church has filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. Submitted on March 6, the petition asks the nation’s highest court to overturn a Georgia Supreme Court decision that upholds the confiscation of Timberridge’s property by Greater Atlanta Presbytery on behalf of the Presbyterian Church (USA). The Georgia court’s disputed 4-3 decision was accompanied by strongly worded dissents from its chief justice and other members of the court.
Joining Timberidge attorney Michael Kendall in this case is Carter G. Phillips, managing partner of the Washington, D.C. office of Sidley Austin LLP. Phillips has argued 74 cases before the U.S. Supreme Court, more than any other attorney currently in private practice. Before his association with Sidley Austin, he served as a law clerk for U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren Burger and as assistant to the United States Solicitor General, arguing nine cases before the U.S. Supreme Court on behalf of the federal government.
The question presented is this: “Whether the ‘neutral principles’ doctrine embodied in the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment permits imposition of a trust on church property when the creation of that trust violates the state’s property and trust laws.”
The issue of settlor consent
If the U.S. Supreme Court grants Certiorari, Timberridge will argue that in awarding Timberridge’s property to the PCUSA, the Georgia exempted denominations from property laws that every secular entity in the state must obey. Georgia law, as is the case in most states, says no one can lay valid claim to another party’s property without that property owner’s consent. The fact that Timberridge owned its property was not contested, and Timberridge says that it never agreed to place its property in trust for the PCUSA.
In the Georgia case, Greater Atlanta Presbytery successfully argued that Timberridge’s membership in the PCUSA implied its agreement to abide by PCUSA decisions, including its tacit consent to an amendment to the PCUSA’s constitution imposing a trust interest on local church property.
Timberridge argued that in order for the PCUSA to enact a valid trust in Georgia, it should have obtained the express consent from each Georgia congregation that owned property. The Georgia court ruled that this application of Georgia trust law would have imposed a “burden” on the denomination. Thus the court exempted the PCUSA from a requirement to which all secular entities in the state that seek to establish trust interests over another entity’s property must comply. In effect, argued Timberridge, the Georgia decision allows the PCUSA to violate Georgia trust law.
Timberridge’s petition specified two reasons why it believes the U.S. Supreme Court should review the Georgia court’s decision: (1) “The judgment implicates a deep and mature conflict over whether a trust may be imposed on church property that secular law would not allow.” (2) “Review is warranted because the decision below is wrong.”
An ‘intolerable’ situation
Timberridge is one of many church property cases that is making its way through the courts, resulting in multiple and conflicting conclusions. The Georgia Supreme Court decision concurs with judgments laid down by the high courts in California, Connecticut and New York, all of which allow the denomination’s constitution (trust clause) to trump state property law. But the Eighth Circuit Court and the Supreme Courts of Arkansas and South Carolina have come down on the opposite side of that issue. These courts have ruled that a church denomination cannot impose a trust that would be otherwise contrary to state trust law.
The U.S. Supreme Court should review the Georgia court’s decision, said Timberridge, because that decision “directly implicates a well-developed conflict among the lower courts on an important issue of federal law that will affect dozens of religious denominations and thousands of churches.” The state courts of last resort “are firmly divided over the limits that the First Amendment imposes on the resolution of church property disputes under the ‘neutral principles’ doctrine.”
These disputes, observed Timberridge, show that “the issue is recurring” in states across the nation. “This question has vexed the lower courts, and the time has come for this court to resolve it,” said Timberridge.
“Given the irreconcilable views expressed in the two sets of conflicting cases, there is a compelling need for the court to provide guidance on an issue that will continue to require the expenditure of scarce litigant and judicial resources with the outcomes being determined by geography rather than a sound constitutional rule. In sum, the situation is intolerable, and the court should rectify it.”
Calling for ‘an even hand’
Timberridge pointed out that when the U.S. Supreme Court suggested a “neutral principles of law” approach to resolving church property disputes (Jones v Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979)), it did so explicitly for the purpose of preventing civil courts from “entangling the state in church affairs.” But, argued Timberridge, the manner in which the Georgia court and some others are interpreting that approach, allows the denomination’s constitution to trump state trust laws. In so doing, the Georgia court “did not act ‘with an even hand,’ Pet. App. at 30, but instead put its thumb on the scale in favor of the national church in a way that violates the First Amendment.”
Timberridge argued that the Jones decision “does not encourage or require states that have adopted ‘neutral principles’ to adopt special rules for resolving disputes over church property; rather, it manifestly prohibits special treatment of property disputes involving religious parties.” Allowing state courts to relieve denominations of the “‘burden’ of establishing ‘intent’ is the antithesis of the ‘neutral principles doctrine’ under Jones.”
The decision is ‘wrong’
Timberridge said that when the U.S. Supreme Court adopted Jones, “it explained that neutral principles are ‘objective, well-established concepts of trust and property law familiar to lawyers and judges.’” The Georgia court’s ruling that allowed the PCUSA to impose a trust on Timberridge’s property without the settlor’s explicit consent, declared Timberridge, “is antithetical to this Court’s view that ‘neutral principles’ would entail application of ‘well-established concepts of trust and property law.’”
In a “what’s good for the goose is good for the gander” argument, Timberridge concluded, “The approach intended by Jones – and required by the First Amendment – is a neutral system where property rules for resolution of secular property disputes likewise apply to disputes when the parties happen to be churches.”
The PCUSA’s Office of the General Assembly has often tried to frame the property issue in “separation of church and state” terms, arguing that civil courts have no warrant to meddle in the internal affairs of churches. But Timberridge and numerous departing PCUSA congregations are saying that it is the PCUSA that encourages civil court meddling. While they agree that civil courts have no jurisdiction in matters of faith, property ownership is an earthy issue, not a heavenly one. On that ground, churches must obey th
e law, just like everyone else.